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Setting the Stage 
The topic of religion-based personal laws in India has been looked at 
from many perspectives: secularism, modernity, national unity and 
integration, community identity, religious freedom and the right to 
equality. The gender dimension has only featured recently as a topic 
and has mainly been discussed by feminist scholars and women’s 
rights activists. This review essay attempts to look at the topic through 
a gender lens. It engages with recent literature that links the personal 
laws and the debate around the Uniform Civil Code (UCC) to the issue 
of women’s rights. The books under review demonstrate the discrimi-
natory aspects of the personal laws and point to possible solutions. 
They outline the interpretation of the personal laws by the Indian 
higher judiciary and other social actors and place the topic in the larger 
regional context.  
Introduction and Historical Background  
In the area of family law, India maintains a system of legal pluralism, 
usually referred to as a personal law system. According to this, the 
different religious communities – Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Jews 
and Parsis – are governed by their respective laws.1 These consist of 
either codified or uncodified rules on issues regarding marriage, 
divorce, maintenance, adoption and inheritance. While in pre-colonial 
times, customs differed significantly from region to region and 
according to other factors such as caste and social affiliation, the 
distinct legal systems became more rigid under British rule. Indeed, on 
the one hand, the British largely avoided interfering with the personal 
laws of the religious communities. For instance, in contrast to the 
unification of penal law, a similar step for the civil law was not taken. 
The personal laws as such were kept, rather than eliminated, as the 
British hoped, by doing so, to dissipate opposition to the colonial 
project by yielding to religious claims (Mullally 2004: 676). But, on the 
other hand, the colonisers modified and unified some religion-based 
practices through legislation where the practices were found parti-
cularly unjust, “backward” or “barbaric” and where there was (alleged) 
support of the local elite or some local reformers. Furthermore, they 
certainly shaped the law through interpretation by British judges 
(Mann 2007).  
Muslim personal law, for instance, underwent a significant process of 
reform and unification in the 1930s, with the enactment of the Muslim 
Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act in 1937 and the Dissolution of 
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Muslim Marriage Act (DMMA) in 1939 through the legislature of British 
India. While the former law imposed uniformity on the Muslim commu-
nity by declaring that all Muslim personal matters would be governed 
by the Sharia, the latter provided Muslim women with a judicial right 
to divorce. Unlike in traditional Hindu law, marriage in Muslim law had 
always been regarded as a dissoluble contract. Hindu law, in contrast, 
viewed marriage as a sacrament, a holy and indissoluble union 
between the couple. It neither granted women a right to divorce nor 
did it grant widows and daughters an absolute right of inheritance 
(Agnes 2004: 71). Hence, before independence Muslim law was 
regarded as modern and progressive. This is important to note as the 
current debate which frequently depicts Muslim personal law as “back-
ward” and discriminatory against women tends to obscure the fact that 
historically, Muslim law’s position on women’s rights was “far superior” 
to that of Brahmanical Hindu law and Christian matrimonial law (Agnes 
2011: 47). 
While the British had decided to maintain the personal law system in 
the area of family law2, the replacement of the religion-based laws by 
a secular Uniform Civil Code was the subject of debate again during 
the independence movement in the early 1940s, and later in the 
sessions of the Constituent Assembly. Some regarded a UCC as a step 
towards unity among the religious communities and hence a means to 
strengthen a common front against British domination (Austin 2001: 
17). National integrity, modernity and secularism were the arguments 
that dominated this debate (Baird 2005: 19-20). The terminology of 
gender-justice and equality was not very prominent at this time; not 
even among female social reformers and freedom fighters such as 
Hansa Mehta and Amrit Kaur (Agnes 2004: 72). In the end, the 
advocates of the Uniform Civil Code did not prevail with their argu-
ments. Instead, when the constitution was drafted in the late 1940s 
some sort of compromise was found, postponing the enactment of the 
UCC. The Code was mentioned among the Directive Principles of State 
Policy, in Article 44 of the Constitution of India: “The State shall 
endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout 
the territory of India”. Thus, the provision directs the state to move 
towards the adoption of a UCC without granting a justiciable right to 
such a legislative step – a solution that some regard as a move to ease 
the sense of anxiety among Muslims in the fledging nation-state and to 
secure the loyalty of Muslim leaders (Mullally 2004: 677). 
While Muslim personal law was codified in the 1930s, the decade 
after independence saw a major codification and modification process 
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for Hindu law. After a long legislative tug-of-war four different laws 
(often collectively referred to as the Hindu Code Bills) were passed. 
The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, among other things made Hindu 
marriages dissoluble contracts and imposed monogamy on Hindus. The 
Hindu Succession Act, 1956, improved inheritance rights for daughters 
and widows. The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, deemed 
the mother the natural guardian of the child “after” the father. Lastly, 
the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, stipulated that girls 
could be taken in adoption (while previously only boys could be 
adopted) and made the consent of the wife mandatory for adoption. It 
also granted maintenance rights to wives and widows.3 While some 
regarded these laws as a first step in the direction of a UCC4, others, 
quite to the contrary, saw in them the “first departure” from the 
objective of Article 44 to secularise and homogenise the family laws 
(Agnes 2004: 94). In any case, it was during the process of drafting 
the Hindu Code Bills that the pros and cons of granting women more 
rights were vehemently debated.5 
General Academic Discourse  
Most academic literature on the personal laws has not dealt specifically 
with the aspect of women’s discrimination, but has focused on other 
aspects, such as secularism or the politics of majority and minority 
communities (see for instance Religion and Personal Law in Secular 
India: A Call to Judgment (2001), edited by Gerald James Larson, or 
Religion and Law in Independent India (2005), by Robert D. Baird, to 
name but two). Handbooks and student literature on family law usually 
restrict themselves to a normative engagement with the provisions of 
the different personal law systems and case law emanating from the 
Indian higher judiciary. Further, a variety of publications engage in 
detail with the specific legal systems of the different communities: 
Hindu personal law (Werner Menski), Muslim personal law (Tahir 
Mahmood), and Christian personal law (Nandini Chatterjee).  
Authors frequently place the contemporary discussion on personal 
laws in India in the historical context. One of the most interesting 
recent books following this approach is Rina Verma Williams’ work 
Postcolonial Politics and personal laws (2006). She regards the politics 
of the personal laws as a prime example of continuity in the politics of 
the colonial and postcolonial Indian state. Looking at the political 
rhetoric of “non-interference” in different phases from the colonial 
period till 2004, Williams (2006: 45) discovers a “gap between rhetoric 
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and action”. She argues that the various governments have con-
tinuously either deployed the rhetoric of non-intervention or the 
argument that legislative intervention was grounded in the will of the 
respective religious community in order to modify personal laws in a 
way that suited their political agenda. In this sense, the post-indepen-
dence governments followed a similar practice as the British had 
employed. Williams proves her argument by analysing the reforms of 
the Muslim personal laws in the 1930s, the Hindu Law reforms in the 
1950s and the politics of the mid-1980s and opines that “the rhetoric 
of non-interference was used more as a tool to justify government 
policies, based on changing political interests, than as an actual guide 
to formulating policy” (Williams 2006: 88-9).  
Another author who has dealt with the political dimension of law-
making is Partha S. Ghosh in his work The Politics of Personal Law in 
South Asia: Identity, Nationalism and the Uniform Civil Code (2007). 
He understands law as a “political subject”, stating: “The essence of 
law is politics” (Ghosh 2007: 5). Not only parliamentarians, he argues, 
but also judges are influenced by the socio-political factors around 
them. He reasons that the answer to the question whether a Uniform 
Civil Code is feasible in a specific country depends on the socio-political 
climate in the country (Ghosh 2007). More interesting than the expo-
sure of law as politics is Ghosh’s comparison of the Indian system of 
personal laws with the systems of neighbouring countries by placing 
the Indian laws in the regional context of South Asia. He compares and 
contrasts the Indian personal law system and its socio-political context 
with the systems in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and the 
Maldives. The book reaches out to both history and the future. Provi-
ding a detailed analysis of the historic facts, he tries to analyse why a 
UCC has not yet been implemented in India and how the discourse has 
differed from the debates around legal reform in the neighbouring 
countries. On the other hand, he rather theoretically asks whether a 
Uniform Civil Code is a precondition for equality and lays out proposals 
for reform for India and the other South Asian nations. Lastly, he 
makes an interesting point when stating that the “South Asian social 
reality is not confined to South Asia; it has migrated beyond the 
region, together with its settlers abroad” (Ghosh 2007: 217). This 
widens the discussion about personal laws and legal pluralism to the 
global context.  
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Feminist Academic Discourse 
It was feminists and women’s rights activists who first applied a 
gender lens to the personal laws rather than solely looking at issues 
like secularism, modernity and national integration. They pointed out 
that all personal laws contain aspects that are discriminatory against 
women. This, many argued, contradicted the right to equality, laid 
down in Article 14 of the Indian Constitution, which reads: “The State 
shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal 
protection of the laws within the territory of India”. Two aspects are 
mentioned in this context: the different treatment of the different 
religious communities as such (for instance, the right to practise 
polygamy is granted to Muslims but to no other community) and the 
different treatment of men and women within the same religious 
community (for instance, within Muslim personal law, men are allowed 
to have more than one wife, but women are not allowed to have more 
than one husband).  
While public discourse mainly stressed Muslim men’s rights to 
polygamy and to unilateral divorce by pronouncing talaq as proble-
matic, feminist authors have tried to disrupt the notion that only 
Muslim personal law was discriminatory against women while the other 
personal laws – especially the Hindu law – were perfectly egalitarian. 
This notion had come up after the reform of the Hindu law in the 
1950s. Hindu law after its modernisation (and with it the whole Hindu 
community) had come to be seen as ‘progressive’, while the Muslim 
law (and the Muslim community as such) was regarded as conservative 
and resistant to change (Williams 2006: 15). Feminist literature has 
tried to disrupt these pro-Hindu and anti-Muslim conceptions by 
explicitly pointing out the pitfalls of the Hindu Code Bills.6 Agnes 
(2011: 21) bemoans that there is a “general presumption that Hindus 
are governed by a secular, egalitarian, and gender-just code and that 
this code should now be extended to Muslims in order to liberate 
Muslim women”. This presumption, she continues, is fostered by the 
Indian judiciary, which has “contributed to this myth by reiterating that 
Hindus have forsaken their personal laws and are governed by a 
common code”. Feminist scholars and women’s rights organisations 
have listed in detail the discriminatory aspects of the various personal 
laws (see for instance Parashar (2005) or the various newsletters from 
the women’s group Saheli). They show, for instance, that Christian 
personal law makes it harder for women to seek divorce than for men. 
Hindu personal law links the wife’s or the widow’s right to maintenance 
to her chastity. According to Hindu, Muslim and Christian personal law, 
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the father is the natural guardian for a (legitimate) child. A married 
Hindu woman can only adopt if her husband is barred from adopting. 
In Hindu succession law women are still excluded from being copar-
ceners in Mitakshra coparcenary. And in Islamic and Parsi law, female 
heirs get less than male heirs of the same degree. 
While the overall feminist critique of the personal laws – that 
personal laws are gender discriminatory - has remained the same over 
time, the discourse on the personal laws and the suggestions that 
followed the critiques have witnessed an interesting shift. In the 1970s 
and 1980s – the high points of the Indian women’s movement – 
feminist and women’s rights activists mostly regarded themselves as 
secular. The religious personal laws were seen as the root cause of 
gender discrimination, and equality for women was believed to be 
achievable only through a secular agenda. Posters from the women’s 
rights movement in the 1970s and 1980s showed women as strangled 
by their religion and the discourse was generally framed as “religion 
versus women’s rights”. The common position among feminists in the 
1970s and 1980s was a call for the enactment of a secular Uniform 
Civil Code, as envisaged in the directive principle of Article 44. This 
changed in the late 1980s and early 1990s when the idea of inter-
sectionality gained a foothold. Feminist scholars today have mostly 
given up on the UCC as a feasible option and present a variety of 
suggestions to achieve gender justice. Among these are mere reforms 
from within the religious communities or the introduction of an optional 
egalitarian civil code while retaining the personal laws. Few still favour 
the introduction of a uniform and gender-just egalitarian code.7 While 
feminists had earlier seen a secular agenda as the way to achieve their 
goals, the scholarship today demonstrates awareness of the inter-
sectionality of gender and religion and academics as well as activists 
would argue for strategies where gender equality can go hand-in-hand 
with religious practice (Jenkins 2009; Menon 2012; Sunder Rajan 
2008).  
It is, however, also visible that this shift led in turn to a fragmen-
tation of the women’s movement. While “the feminist position” was 
somewhat more coherent on the issue of the personal laws in the 
1970s and 1980s (although there have always been different strands 
of argumentation), since the 1990s the movement has definitely no 
longer spoken with a uniform voice. Big legislative changes have not 
been initiated, neither are they likely in the current political climate. 
Indeed, there was some media coverage on the Uniform Civil Code 
again when the BJP came to power in 2014.8 The party had promised 
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the introduction of a UCC in its election manifesto. But so far no steps 
have been taken in this direction.  
Despite this legislative stalemate, the topic of the personal laws con-
tinues to feature as a subject in academic literature. Scholars have 
engaged with the issue from a legal as well as from a political or social 
science point of view and further from the angle of women’s and 
gender studies. While legal text books and socio-political analyses of 
the topic have long exhibited a “gender blind spot”, feminist literature 
and publications from women’s and gender studies often lacked a 
distinct engagement with the legal discourse and frequently argued 
solely on a programmatic basis. In feminist literature, the personal 
laws tend to feature only as one issue among many. For instance, in 
Indian Feminisms: Law Patriarchies and Violence in India, by Geetan-
jali Gangoli (2007), in Rights of Hindu and Muslim Women, edited by 
Neera Bharihoke (2008), and in Redefining Family Law in India, edited 
by Archana Parashar and Amita Dhanda (2008), the authors deal with 
a vast variety of topics such as citizenship, empowerment, the situ-
ation of rural, tribal or Dalit women, women’s economic rights and 
work participation, the right to health, women’s sexuality, sexual 
labour, domestic violence, custodial rape – and women under personal 
laws and the debate around the UCC. Often it is instead the socio-
economic components of the family laws and the gap between the law 
and lived reality that are the subject of academic discourse (see for 
instance Kirti Singh, Separated and Divorced Women in India: 
Economic Rights and Entitlements, 2013).  
Only few works combine both a deep legal analysis with a feminist 
critique of the personal laws. Flavia Agnes’ and Indira Jaising’s 
publications certainly provide exceptional examples of a detailed 
discussion of the legal constraints, while looking through a gender lens 
and enriching their academic work with first-hand experiences from 
their work as practising lawyers and as women’s rights activists. In 
Germany, Judith Dick has dealt with the topic of the personal laws 
from a legal as well as from a gender perspective (Offizieller Rechts-
pluralismus im Konkurrenzverha ̈ltnis unterschiedlich geregelter Ge-
schlechterverhältnisse: Das Recht der Khasi im System der personalen 
Rechte (personal laws) Indiens, 2006). In her field study on the 
Khasis, she deals not so much with the religious personal laws but 
rather with tribal laws, examining how Indian courts handle legal 
pluralism when they are concerned with customary law.  
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The books in the following review were chosen because they deal 
with the personal laws at the interface between law / political science 
and gender studies. They are all principally written for an academic 
readership interested in the personal law system in the Indian context. 
They do not focus so much on “classical” problems such as secularism, 
modernity or community identity, but engage with feminist viewpoints 
on the issue and point to gender discrimination. The selected publi-
cations look not only at the legislator but also take the courts and 
other state actors into account. They deal with the interpretations of 
the personal laws by the Indian higher judiciary, pointing out pro-
gressive and activist interpretations as well as institutionalised biases. 
Furthermore, they engage with the role of religious communities and 
civil society in making the personal law system more gender-just. In 
that sense, they broaden the horizon of options to achieve social 
change and widen the debate on the topic.  
Book Review  
An extensive overview of the Indian family law is provided by Flavia 
Agnes in her two-volume work Family Law. Agnes analyses the differ-
rent personal law systems, as well as the relevant case law, from a 
feminist perspective. While in the first volume she deals with “Family 
Law and Constitutional Claims”, the second volume engages with 
“Marriage, Divorce and Matrimonial Litigation”. What makes her books 
stand out from the ordinary text books on family law is that Agnes – 
one of India’s leading women’s rights activists and head of a women’s 
rights group – engages with the topic specifically through a feminist 
lens. Explicitly grounding her arguments within feminist legal theory 
and calling herself a “perspective scholar”, she challenges “the tradi-
tional notion that law is a neutral, objective, rational set of rules, 
unaffected in content and form by the passions and perspectives of 
those who possess and wield the power inherent in law and legal 
institutions” (Agnes 2011: xxiv). The concern of her work is “to assess 
how women perceive justice, how they pursue and access it” and to 
determine the success of their pursuit (ibid.). Agnes understands “law” 
not in the sense of legal positivism, but as a “social mediator of 
relationships between people within the broader spectrum of legal 
realism [...] determined by the actual practices of courts, law offices, 
and political stations, rather than as rules and doctrines set forth in 
statutes or learned treaties” (ibid.: xxi-xxii). Law is not static to her, 
but moves with the times as there is a “dynamic interaction between 
the legal order and social process” (ibid.: 107). 
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Volume I engages in detail with the different personal laws of the 
religious communities and their respective regulations on the topics of 
marriage and property, divorce and succession. Agnes broadens the 
scope, which commonly only focuses on either two (Hindu and Muslim) 
or four (with the addition of Christian and Parsi) personal law systems, 
by engaging with seven different systems: Hindu, Muslim, Christian, 
Parsi and Jewish law, as well as civil / secular laws and the customary 
(mostly tribal) laws. Her intention is explicitly to “widen the debate” 
which frequently constructs a dichotomy between “progressive” Hindu 
law and “regressive-fundamentalist” Muslim law. She also wants to 
disrupt the notion of customary laws as anti-women and state enact-
ments or official laws as pro-women (Agnes 2011: 2). 
In her very detailed analysis she not only describes the different 
laws and practices, but lists a vast number of decisions of the Indian 
higher judiciary, which through their interpretation of personal laws 
contributed to the “judge-made” law. Quoting a vast number of High 
Court and Supreme Court judgments, she exposes the often sexist or 
paternalistic remarks of Indian judges. She examines constitutional 
provisions such as the right to equality and critically deals with the 
different attempts at formulating a Uniform Civil Code which have been 
made especially in the 1980s. Agnes is a well-known opponent of the 
UCC and probably the main advocate for reforms from within the 
religious communities rather than imposed laws from above. In her 
view, the UCC “would inadvertently situate minority women in an 
antagonist relationship against their own communities, and hence may 
not receive the support of women from these communities” (Agnes 
2011: xxvii). Instead, she calls feminists to take up an intersectional 
approach. 
Volume II deals specifically with litigation in family law. Here, the 
division is not along the lines of the different religious communities and 
their laws, but along the lines of different topics: Chapter 1 is devoted 
to marriage and divorce, Chapter 2 engages with matrimonial rights 
and obligations. Agnes deals with a variety of different issues ranging 
from the evolution of the institution of marriage, to the various 
grounds for divorce, to marriage with expatriate Indians. As in Volume 
I, she combines the discussion of legal texts and theory with a 
depiction of the corresponding case law. At times she contrasts the 
Indian legal system to “Western” concepts such as the “breakdown 
theory” in matrimonial law. The third and last chapter of the book is 
devoted to the work of family courts from the specific perspective of 
gender justice. She bases her findings on a field study of family courts 
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and an analysis of data from court records and interviews with judges 
and other persons related to the judiciary. She draws a rather 
pessimistic conclusion here, stating that the introduction of family 
courts, which was intended to provide for a “less formal and technical 
and more women-friendly environment”, has failed to ensure gender 
justice (Agnes 2011b: 317). 
The two volumes provide an extensive overview of the topic of 
Indian family law and exhibit, in a detailed and well-researched way, 
the discriminatory aspects of the personal laws. Agnes convincingly 
demonstrates that it is not only the laws and customs that are 
problematic, but also the often conservative, paternalistic and some-
times sexist mindset of the judges. She demonstrates this with an 
extensive overview of the case law. She does, however, also mention 
positive examples and therefore provides for a fairly balanced picture. 
She points out positive examples of small legislative reforms (such as 
in the reforms of Christian personal law) and progressive and forward-
looking judgments. The fact that she draws on her own experience as 
a lawyer and women’s rights activist gives the reader an interesting 
insight into the complex system and demonstrates how law and social 
reality often diverge. The problems, the reader understands, do not 
only lie in discriminatory norms but in the lived reality of a patriarchal 
society.  
As many cases and debates can obviously be mentioned under 
several topics, the pitfalls of these two volumes are that some sections 
are redundant and a clear structure is sometimes missing. However, 
this does not make the book less recommendable. Especially for those 
readers who are not familiar with Agnes’ work, the two volumes com-
prise a comprehensive overview of her positions on the various issues 
regarding the personal laws. For scholars who are familiar with Indian 
family law this work will provide a new and critical perspective, as 
Agnes sharply points out the pitfalls of the laws and the court 
decisions. The two volumes will be interesting for students of law as 
well as for Indian and foreign scholars who seek to better understand 
the complex system of Indian family law in its socio-cultural context.  
Personal Law Reforms and Gender Empowerment: A Debate on 
Uniform Civil Code (2006) by Nandini Chavan and Qutub Jehan Kidwai 
is co-authored by two female scholars respectively belonging to the 
Hindu and the Muslim community. The book promises “to explore the 
possibilities of reform” in Muslim and Hindu personal law from a 
women’s rights perspective (Chavan & Kidwai 2006: 13). It is divided 
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into two sections, one dealing with Hindu law, the other dealing with 
Muslim law, both in the context of the debate about the Uniform Civil 
Code.  
In the first part of the book, Chavan and Kidwai analyse the position 
of women under Hindu law during the ancient, medieval and colonial 
times and in post-independence India. Hinduism is understood as “a 
distinct philosophy rather than a religion” with its own “distinct set of 
values and culture” (Chavan & Kidwai 2006: 136). The authors attri-
bute the fact that historically women suffered discrimination, amongst 
other things, to feudalism and patriarchy. They set out the different 
legal reforms but do not unfortunately provide an in-depth discussion 
on the discriminatory aspects of the laws. Rather, they limit them-
selves to describing the historical facts, without providing many new 
insights. The topic of personal laws and the UCC is then linked to the 
Hindutva ideology. The authors rightly point out that, with the Shah 
Bano controversy,9 the political climate became communalised and 
legislative reforms have since become rather difficult. They unmask 
the BJP’s call for a UCC as a move inspired by the wish to “Hinduise” 
the country rather than to provide for gender justice and point out the 
dilemma for feminists after the “hijacking” of the topic by the Hindu 
nationalists. Up to this point, there aren’t many new insights here.  
In a chapter titled “Women’s Movement and Uniform Civil Code” 
Chavan and Kidwai link the topic of personal laws to the campaigning 
of women’s rights activists. They engage with different forms of Indian 
feminism and describe the shift in the women’s movement in the early 
nineties, concluding that the inner fragmentation of the movement is a 
major obstacle: “The women’s movement […] is too divided to adopt 
any forceful agenda for reform of family laws” (Chavan & Kidwai 2006: 
168). The chapter touches an interesting point, but could have gone 
much further. A discussion of the approaches, strategies and tools that 
the different segments of the women’s groups use in order to push for 
gender justice and their respective successes would have been inte-
resting here.  
The precise findings and solutions of the first book section remain a 
little unclear. The authors seem to hold that Hindu law contains many 
discriminatory aspects and that these should be wiped out through 
legislative reforms, without interfering in religious affairs. How pre-
cisely and by whom this should be done is not quite clear. On the one 
hand, they acknowledge that in the current communalised atmosphere 
big legislative reforms or the introduction of a Uniform Civil Code are 
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unlikely to be successful. On the other hand, they are of the opinion 
that legislative reforms in personal laws could be achieved “easily” as 
“personal laws as they exist today have hardly anything to do with 
religion, especially the Hindu personal laws have virtually no connec-
tion with religious texts” (Chavan & Kidwai 2006: 172). This undiffe-
rentiated statement makes it hard to have faith in the authors’ 
suggestion, as nice as it would be to simply bring religion in line with 
gender justice. One wonders what the reforms would look like and who 
would initiate them – the state government, the religious society or the 
women’s rights movement. A serious engagement with the suggestions 
that have been made – Egalitarian Civil Code, optional secular code or 
mere reforms from within – and the authors’ assumptions as to why 
these have failed would have been desirable.  
Part II of the book looks at Muslim personal law and the Uniform 
Civil Code. It begins, like the first part, with a historical overview, 
covering the evolution of Islamic law during the time of the Prophet 
Mohammed and the evolution of Sharia Law over several centuries, up 
to the shaping of Muslim personal law in colonial and postcolonial 
India. The authors opine that the problem lies not within Islamic law as 
such, but within the wrong interpretations and practices. Islamic law in 
its original form, it is argued, provides a system of equality: “In Islam 
the husband and wife are equal partners in a sacred relationship of 
trust and confidence” (Chavan & Kidwai 2006: 210). What is proble-
matic is that “[r]egrettably, a pretty large number of Muslims naively 
practise an awfully distorted version of [the Sharia]. The Personal Law 
[...] is the worst sufferer at the hands of the ignorant. As a result, 
there are many wrong notions of the Muslim personal Law prevailing 
around us” (ibid.: 204). The distorted image of Muslim personal law, 
the authors believe, was initially constructed by the British who 
portrayed the Muslim personal law as “inhuman and uncivilized” (ibid.: 
206). The solution to this vexed situation can only lie in a reorientation 
of the interpretation of Muslim personal law:  
It is high time that our judges and lawyers stop looking at Islamic 
Law through the spectacles of the colonial courts and their past 
and present rapporteurs. They must understand the Islamic law, 
its original values and prevent the widespread misuse of its lofty 
principles (ibid.: 221). 
A more detailed description of who has the authority to claim what 
these “original values” of Islam are is missing. Also, the implication 
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that one can look at the issue in an unbiased and neutral way is rather 
misleading.  
An interesting part of the book is the comparison of the Muslim 
personal law in India and in other “Muslim countries”. The authors go 
through the different concepts of Islamic law and mention examples of 
how other countries have made legislative changes regarding, inter 
alia, the minimum age of marriage, the various forms of dissolution of 
marriage, or polygamy. The much debated triple talaq, for instance, 
has been abolished in some countries. Thereby the authors demon-
strate that “religious law” is not as originary and unchangeable as 
sometimes argued. On the contrary, Muslim personal law is quite 
diverse from a global perspective. In this context, it would have been 
interesting to learn more about the positive and negative effects of the 
legislative changes in the countries of comparison and whether they 
were initiated through the state government or through the Muslim 
community.  
The authors are of the opinion that Muslim personal law in its 
current form needs reform. Triple talaq, they opine, for instance, 
should be abolished. But in a “post-Babri Masjid demolition atmo-
sphere” this is difficult (Chavan & Kidwai 2006: 258). Hence, an 
approach of “non-interference from outside” (ibid.: 259) is recom-
mended; the impulses for reform should come from within the Muslim 
community. In this reform process the All India Muslim Personal Law 
Board (AIMPLB) is expected to play a major role. The AIMPLB had, for 
instance, drafted a model Nikahnama (an Islamic marriage contract, 
that stipulates rights and responsibilities for the bride and the groom); 
an action that provoked a discussion on women’s rights and that the 
authors regard a step into the right direction. “The ulama and well 
known Muslim lawyers”, the authors opine, “should draft a compre-
hensible bill in this respect, but well within Shari’ah framework, and 
give it to the government to enact it through Parliament” (ibid.: 256). 
However, who precisely is meant by these well-known scholars and 
lawyers, how it would be ensured that gender equality is taken into 
account in the reform process and how (Muslim) women’s rights 
organisations could contribute to this remains unanswered.  
In a nutshell, the argument of this publication seems to be that the 
personal laws in the current state need reform as they are discrimi-
natory towards women. A UCC might be desirable, but difficult to 
achieve because of the Hindutva politics and because the personal laws 
have become such an important marker of identity in a communalised 
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atmosphere. Instead, reforms from within are suggested as more 
promising. These could be achieved by going back to the roots of 
religious laws.  
The book provides a decent overview on the personal laws rather 
than a critical analysis. Most chapters are rather descriptive, narrating 
historic events and the legislative status quo without adding many new 
ideas to the debate. While the laws and religious practices are out-
lined, the authors do not examine the interpretation of the same by 
the Indian higher judiciary, which – as Agnes shows – has often given 
the laws a new meaning. The concluding sections of the different 
chapters are short and the reader can often only guess what the 
authors intend to demonstrate. While the idea of juxtaposing two 
perspectives on the personal laws by involving authors from two differ-
rent communities in a common project is appealing, the reader gets 
the impression that the two texts were written independently and then 
simply put together. More synchronisation in the line of argumentation, 
some comparison of the two different legal systems or a common 
conclusion would have been appealing. In particular, the promising 
section on the personal laws and the women’s rights movement could 
have shown how far Hindu and Muslim women were fighting on the 
same side and how the discourse on intersectionality influenced the 
women’s movement. At times it remains unclear whether the authors 
are making an original point, or whether they are mentioning someone 
else’s idea. The bibliography is rather short. The selection of texts for 
the annex of the book remains unclear. To sum up, while scholars from 
the field will not find many new insights or research results here, the 
book might serve as an introductory piece for students who have not 
previously worked on the personal laws. As the idea behind the book 
seemed like an interesting project, it could very well be taken as a 
starting point for further scholarship. 
Alamgir Muhammad Serajuddin, in Muslim Family Law, Secular 
Courts and Muslim Women of South Asia: A Study in Judicial Activism 
(2011), narrows the topic of personal laws down even further and 
engages only with Muslim personal law. In terms of region the author 
opens up the area, looking not only at India, but also at Pakistan and 
Bangladesh. The interesting feature of this book is its focus on judicial 
activism, hence, the understanding of the courts as a motor of social 
change. The book intends to describe “the role of the South Asian 
courts in the interpretation and application of Muslim family law” 
(Serajuddin 2011: xi). The central questions in this context are 
whether courts only interpret and apply the law or whether they also 
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make law, how far courts may deviate from the interpretation given by 
the classical jurists, whether they should take social changes into 
account and whether the courts themselves – rather than the legislator 
– are appropriate instruments for social change? Serajuddin tackles 
these questions through a detailed analysis of case law, which he 
deems “a useful social barometer and tool of social change” (ibid.: xv). 
His study is not only based on the judgments but also on an analysis of 
the facts of the cases, the pleadings, the reasons given by the judges 
for their decisions, the social settings and the judgments’ effects on 
society. “It is only by relating the cases to the life of the parties and 
society,” he states, “that the study of case-law can be made inte-
resting, meaningful and purpose-oriented” (ibid.: xv). The book is 
divided into six chapters. Besides the introduction and the conclusion 
he dedicates one chapter each to British India, post-Independence 
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.  
The author comprehensibly explains the concept of judicial activism 
which can refer to a variety of things: the dynamism of the judges, 
judicial creativity, a social revolution brought about by the judges or a 
cultural revolution brought about by the judges. In India, the term is 
usually associated with the court’s coming to the rescue of the “weaker 
sections” of society (Serajuddin 2011: 2). Serajuddin links the topic of 
judicial activism to Sharia law, which is straightforwardly described as 
discriminatory and problematic:  
The classical Shari’a law of family relations is based on patriarchal 
family organization and male privileges, leading to legal and 
social discrimination against women and reducing them to an 
inferior status which is incompatible with present day notions of 
gender equality and social justice. The discrimination against 
Muslim women is especially pronounced in such vital matters as 
marriage, divorce, maintenance and inheritance (Serajuddin 
2011: 6). 
Serajuddin claims that the legacy that the independent subcontinent 
inherited from British India was problematic. As the British judges 
were ignorant of the laws and customs that prevailed, and unfamiliar 
with the institutions of the country and with the Arabic language, the 
law was often “misunderstood, misinterpreted or misapplied by the 
courts” (Serajuddin 2011: 29). The author skilfully outlines how after 
independence the two, and later three, different countries took very 
different lines when interpreting Muslim personal laws. While one 
might expect that, in secular India, the courts would take an activist 
and liberal standpoint, while in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, courts 
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would be more conservative, in fact the two decades after 
independence show the opposite scenario. Serajuddin draws a 
distinction between two periods. From 1947 until 1970, Indian courts 
held that they were bound by the doctrine of precedent to follow the 
rules of interpretation as laid down in previous cases from colonial 
times. Pakistan’s courts, on the other hand, refused to abide by these 
decisions and freely and independently interpreted the rules of Sharia. 
The result of this was that Muslim personal law remained rather rigid 
and conservative in India, while it became more flexible and progres-
sive in Pakistan. This changed in the decades after 1971. Interestingly, 
in the 1980s Pakistan’s courts abandoned their activist stance and the 
Indian courts took it up. The author proves his thesis by mentioning a 
series of High Court and Supreme Court cases. They are grouped 
according to the subject they deal with: maintenance, the different 
forms of talaq, judicial divorce under the DMMA, restitution of conjugal 
rights, registration of marriage and custody. 
Serajuddin draws a positive conclusion from his analysis: “In an 
admirable display of scholarship and creativity” the South Asian 
judiciary has given examples of “wide, liberal and creative 
interpretation” of the different rules. It has shown that it is possible to 
adapt Muslim personal law to the needs of a modern and forward-
looking society without deviating from the Islamic framework. 
Serajuddin strongly argues for judicial activism in cases of legislative 
reluctance. Although the judge’s primary duty is to interpret law, they 
are sometimes obliged to take up the role of the legislator, “especially 
in those cases where the injustice and inequity of personal law on the 
weaker section of society, namely women, is most glaring” (ibid.: 
248). India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, he opines, can share and 
benefit from each other’s experiences if their jurisdictions collaborate.  
The author points out right at the beginning that the book’s aim is to 
“appeal to a wider audience than only law students and practitioners” 
(Serajuddin 2011: xiv). He certainly succeeds with this attempt, 
avoiding being too technical in his language without being imprecise. 
The topic is well-researched and an extensive bibliography is provided. 
The vast number of cases the author deals with makes it possible to 
analyse general trends within the judiciary. The selection of cases is 
well balanced and the author looks at both sides, contrasting contro-
versial and problematic decisions with “illuminating and progressive” 
ones. The author provides a coherent description of the circumstances 
and the outcome of the cases. At times, however, the reader needs to 
draw his or her own conclusions as the text remains a little descriptive 
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rather than analytical. Further, it would have been interesting to read 
how the author explains the general trends, whether trends in the 
Supreme Courts differ from the ones in the different High Courts and 
why he thinks some courts have deviated from these trends in a 
particular way. Also, a more differentiated discussion of the ‘positive’ 
judgments would have been appreciated. As a matter of fact, some 
judgments that are well-meant tend to put women in a very weak 
position and actually have a very paternalistic character. Here, a 
reference to feminist literature, which has analysed the image of 
women that is depicted in courtrooms, would have been welcome. The 
comparison with Pakistan and Bangladesh makes the book especially 
interesting and places the issue in the broader South Asian context. 
Overall, the book is definitely worth reading for law students as well as 
academics and practitioners who are interested in broadening their 
knowledge on adjudication in Muslim personal law.  
Gopika Solanki, in Adjudication in Religious Family Laws: Cultural 
Accommodation, Legal Pluralism, and Gender Equality in India (2011) 
engages with state-society interactions in the adjudication of religious 
laws. She analyses the Indian model of legal pluralism in the gover-
nance of marriage and divorce under Hindu and Muslim personal laws. 
Hereby her focus lies at the tension between cultural autonomy and 
gender equality. The author’s main argument is that the Indian state 
has adopted what she calls a model of “shared adjudication”. Accord-
ing to this, the state enjoys only restrained autonomy in the regulation 
of marriage and divorce and willingly splits its adjudicative authority 
with social actors and organisations. Unlike many other (feminist) 
authors, Solanki opines that this Indian concept of legal pluralism can 
facilitate diversity and ensure gender equality at the same time. It can 
prevent the ossification of religious identities and produce justice that 
is multilocational. This is quite a provocative and new way of looking at 
the Indian system of legal pluralism.  
Solanki’s study offers an “ethnographic account” of state courts and 
multiple other societal legal sites. These other sites could be sect 
councils, informal legal sites such as mosques, “doorstep courts”, 
women’s organisations and lawyers’ offices. Her field of research is the 
city of Mumbai. For her work, she has analysed court records from the 
Bombay High Court and the Family Courts and conducted a vast 
number of interviews. Solanki develops her argument in four main 
sections. She begins by outlining the theoretical framework of the 
shared adjudication model. She then engages with trends in matri-
monial disputes and points out that there are many commonalities 
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between judicial bargaining, interpretation and treatment of cases filed 
under Hindu and Muslim law. Indeed – unlike popular debate which 
often pits Hindu and Muslim law as opposite and dissimilar to one 
another – Solanki argues that Hindu and Muslim families are conceived 
along similar, though not identical, lines in state law and courts. 
Subsequently, she devotes a chapter each to Hindu and Muslim law 
and the interaction between state and sub-state actors in adjudication 
processes under the respective religious law. Concluding, she points 
out how the shared adjudication model may facilitate gender justice 
while at the same time promoting cultural diversity.  
Solanki claims that the shared adjudication model is linked to two 
simultaneous trends: the centralisation of law (codification of customs 
and policy making through legal precedents) and the decentralisation 
of law (fragmentation of law as there is no coherence in judgments). 
Gender equality in this context is not necessarily brought about 
through more centralisation. Instead, it is advanced through the 
(inter)action of various players: “independent, efficient, proactive, and 
sympathetic judges”, “skilful lawyers”, women’s organisations and 
social workers. The activist judge, whom Serajuddin also identified, is 
here mentioned as only one among the many social actors that can 
produce social change. Her argument is backed up by a detailed study 
of different approaches to adjudication in Hindu and Muslim communi-
ties. In both religious contexts she notes a dynamic interaction 
between the state and sub-state actors. These sub-state actors might 
be individuals (such as lawyers, clergy, family members and local 
“strongmen”), organisations (religious organisations, political parties, 
sect councils or caste panchayats) or “doorstep courts” (residential 
committees or women’s groups). She points out especially how 
women’s organisations function as an informal forum of justice and 
expand the reach of state law (Solanki 2011, 220). Social workers, 
lawyers, academics and activists working with these groups mediate 
between family members, involve the police if necessary, provide 
counselling and offer legal aid, arrange for shelter for women in crisis 
situations, organise workshops and also function as “moral watch-
dogs”.  
Solanki depicts that the normative world shaped by the state and 
that practised by societal actors coexist. These different worlds might 
conflict. State law might conflict with religious laws and even among 
the religious groups there might be different interpretations of certain 
legal provisions and controversy about who represents the group. This 
“Intragroup heterogeneity questions the rhetoric around ‘authentic 
 REVIEW ESSAY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
389 
religious laws’” (ibid.: 331). For Solanki this is, however, no argument 
for unification of the laws. Instead, she points out the advantages of 
the plurality. The availability of multiple legal avenues allows indivi-
duals to choose among the different forums (“forum shopping”). For 
instance, people would not necessarily have to go to court for a 
divorce, but could employ mediators, kinsmen or caste panchayats to 
dissolve marriages. While Solanki (ibid.: 314) emphasises that “the 
mere existence of multiple legal avenues" is not necessarily enough to 
safeguard women’s rights in law, the heterogeneous options definitely 
"increase the choices for litigants”. The agency of individual women is 
linked to their bargaining power through combining legal alternatives 
(ibid.: 332). Gender justice must be pushed for, from above and 
below. Rather than including it as a precondition, or a limit to cultural 
accommodation, it is up to the different societal actors (especially 
feminists) to use the different avenues in order to achieve equality.  
While most (feminist) literature criticises the personal law system as 
unjust and discriminatory, Solanki certainly offers a new perspective in 
pointing out the positive aspects of legal pluralism. Her concept of 
“shared adjudication” is an interesting model and an important 
contribution to the scholarly discourse. Her language is clear and – 
though a little repetitive at times – the book is appealing and infor-
mative. As a Member of the Forum Against Oppression of Women and 
as a social worker at the special Cell for Women and Children in 
Mumbai, Solanki steps into a familiar terrain with this work. She 
nevertheless understands to write for an audience that hasn’t neces-
sarily studied conceptions of Hindu or Muslim marriage law and 
provides a helpful glossary of terms at the beginning of the book. Her 
work draws on a vast amount of investigation and interviews, which 
depict the lives of the women in Mumbai. The stories she tells, while 
often set in a patriarchal context, are to some extent stories of success 
and agency. The picture that Solanki draws of the Indian legal system 
and the Mumbai Family Court is certainly a more positive one than the 
one that Flavia Agnes draws.  
Solanki states that the system of legal pluralism allows women to 
choose from a wide range of possibilities and to exercise forum 
shopping in order to achieve their aims. This is convincing when it 
comes to the state institutions vis-á-vis the means of adjudication and 
mediation by the religious communities or other actors such as 
women’s rights organisations. But doesn’t the author go a little far 
when also taking into account local “strongmen” and private detectives 
who use methods that violate criminal law? Solanki claims that the use 
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of “physical violence, coercion, and threats as a strategy used against 
opponents in the litigation process has been mentioned frequently by 
various litigants” (Solanki 2011: 276). “The underworld, the militant 
wings of political parties, and offshoots of political parties”, she 
continues, “often get involved in ‘family matters’” (ibid.: 276-7). It is 
certainly interesting to know that these methods are widely used and 
that women (and men) see them as an option when trying to achieve 
their (legitimate or illegitimate) aims. But to mention these methods 
as part of the broad array of avenues that a litigant may choose from 
might be problematic. Wouldn’t this mean that every state in the world 
maintains a system of “legal pluralism” considering that everywhere 
illegal means co-exist besides the legal ones? And do these methods 
not make the system more unpredictable, insecure and anarchic than 
simply providing another option? In the end, illegal methods can be 
used not only by women, but also against them. Solanki herself quotes 
cases in which women were harassed, spied or prevented from going 
to court by “strongmen” hired by their husbands’ families (ibid.: 262). 
Doesn’t this rather reduce options instead of widening them?   
Another question is how representative Mumbai is to make a general 
statement about India, as Solanki does with her book title. The author 
justifies her selection of the research site by, among other things, the 
fact that the Family Court in Mumbai is perceived to be one of the 
most efficient family courts in the country, that Mumbai was affected 
by communal riots, that the city is a stronghold of a Hindu funda-
mentalist party and an area where many women’s rights organisations 
have been active in legal reforms. While these facts certainly make 
Mumbai a very interesting research site, they do not necessarily make 
such a cosmopolitan city representative of India. Nevertheless, the 
example of Mumbai is certainly helpful for understanding general 
trends and systems and can surely be a starting point for further 
research on legal pluralism. Overall, the work is highly recommendable 
and will definitely be of interest to social scientists and legal scholars 
working on areas related to law, gender and religion in South Asia.  
The most recent publication providing a comprehensive study on the 
personal laws is Nation and Family: Personal Law, Cultural Pluralism, 
and Gendered Citizenship in India by Narendra Subramanian (2014). 
As the title indicates, the author combines two aspects that have 
previously often been looked at as separate issues: nation-building and 
gender equality. Subramanian sees the personal laws as an “important 
arena in which official nationalism, multiculturalism, secularism and 
citizenship were formed and expressed in India since independence” 
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(Subramanian 2014: 3). The author looks at the public discourses, the 
legislation and the case law of India’s three main personal law systems 
– that of the Hindus, the Muslims and the Christians – and compares 
the Indian experience with other countries that inherited a system with 
laws specific to religious or ethnic groups. His central questions are 
why personal laws were retained in postcolonial India, what the nature 
and magnitude of changes in Hindu, Muslim and Christian law were 
and how the nature of these changes could be explained. The book is 
divided into six chapters. It begins with an outline of a comparative 
theoretical perspective on personal laws and an extensive comparison 
of the topics of nationalism and family reform in several countries. It 
then focuses on the Indian context, looking at Hindu law on the one 
hand and at the personal laws of the two largest minority religions on 
the other.  
The author divides the countries with personal laws into different 
groups: those that have undergone extensive modernist reforms (such 
as Turkey, Albania and Tunisia), those with moderate modernist 
reform (for instance, Libya, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, India, Bangla-
desh and Malaysia) and those with limited change (Morocco, Algeria, 
Lebanon and Syria). He shows that various factors influence the course 
of religion-based family laws. In a nutshell, he argues that the perso-
nal laws are linked to two sets of mutually interacting factors: features 
of state-society relations and the discourses of community that are 
salient among ruling elites or groups with significant influence over 
policy (Subramanian 2014: 45). Both the features of state-society 
relations (social structure, nature of state-society engagements, 
coalitions, reform projects) and the discourse of community (dis-
courses about nation, cultural groups and traditions) have links to 
patterns of nation formation, recognition and family law. They influ-
ence the approaches of states to the personal law systems that they 
inherited (ibid.: 70). For instance, personal law reforms were most 
extensive in countries such as Turkey and Tunisia, where “the state 
was already somewhat autonomous of crucial institutions” and “elites 
prioritized increased state control over religious, ethnic, and kin insti-
tutions”. On the other hand, reforms were barely attempted in 
countries like Lebanon, Syria or Algeria where lineage leaders had 
more influence and professional, commercial, and industrial elites were 
weaker (ibid.: 71). 
Subramanian shows that in post-independence India personal laws 
were changed less when compared with other aspects of multicultu-
ralism such as language policy, federalism and preferential policies. 
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The reforms that did occur mostly applied to the Hindu community, but 
not to the minority communities. While the 1950s witnessed a large 
scale reform of Hindu law through legislation, from the 1960s it was 
also the courts who changed the law through their progressive inter-
pretation of certain provisions: “The courts played major roles in the 
changes in divorce, marriage, and alimony law, promoting some of the 
major legislative initiatives” (Subramanian 2014: 142). Both routes to 
reform –legislation and the judiciary – were often initiated or 
supported by civil society organisations and women’s groups. Subra-
manian writes: “The growth in civil society mobilization, the increased 
attention of rights organizations to litigation and legal policy, and the 
experience of the emergency led certain judges in the higher courts to 
support the rights of weaker groups sporadically” (ibid.: 141).  
A different picture emanates from the analysis of the personal laws 
of the two largest religious minorities. The laws of Muslims and 
Christians were not changed by policy makers soon after 
independence. This is remarkable, as the will for political reforms 
(based on group traditions and group concerns) was there among the 
two communities – especially among the Muslims and from the 1980s 
onwards also among the Christians. In fact, “support for personal-law 
reform was no weaker among Muslims than among Hindus” (Subrama-
nian 2014: 262-3). Subramanian (ibid.: 263) explains the fact that 
Hindu law was changed extensively while Muslim law was not via the 
argument that “the majority of political elites took Hindu cultures to be 
dynamic” while “they considered Muslims to be embedded in introver-
ted cultures incompatible with modernity and postcolonial develop-
ment”. Further, many policy makers regarded Christians as more 
interested in social reform than Muslims. This was certainly out of tune 
with mobilisation for personal-law reform, which was generally greater 
among Muslims than among Christians. However, Subramanian ex-
plains, “as Muslim mobilizers based their personal-law initiatives on 
religious discourses with which the political and bureaucratic elite were 
largely unfamiliar, these elites neither understood nor accommodated 
their reform aspirations” (ibid.: 264). Hence, in post-colonial India 
little change occurred in the area of the minority laws via legislation.  
But change did appear in the judges’ interpretation of Muslim and 
Christian law when cases were brought before the courts. Here, 
Muslims challenged the validity of talaq, the economic consequences of 
divorce, the validity of polygamy, bequests of family members and the 
implications of apostasy for the status of marriage (ibid.: 214-5). 
Christians litigated the conditions under which divorce would be 
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accessible and the possibilities of adoption (ibid.: 215). In many of 
these cases, an attempt by courts to interpret legislation to increase 
women’s rights can be noticed. As in the section on Hindu law, 
Subramanian links the reforms of the minority laws to the activism of 
civil society and the women’s movement who “promoted support for 
women’s rights, and mobilized understandings of group tradition that 
provided grounds for extensive reforms” (ibid.: 279). It is “changes in 
patterns of mobilization, salient discourses of community, and values 
regarding the family”, he states, that have enabled modifications in 
personal law policy since the 1970s (ibid.: 279).  
What makes the work stand out is certainly Subramanian’s 
approach, which connects the two topics of nation and gender equality. 
While previous scholarship tended to select either of these aspects, 
Subramanian shows how the topics are actually interlinked. The 
interference or non-interference of the Indian state (or other states) in 
personal law issues can be explained only when the discourse of 
nationalism is understood. Subramanian here puts the personal laws in 
the broader picture of academic discourse, which is enlightening. He 
also broadens the spectrum when putting the Indian experience not 
only in a historical but also in a global comparative context. The 
detailed description and the theorisation of why different post-colonial 
countries adopted different stances toward the personal laws are 
demanding but enriching and provide an important contribution to 
scholarship. The author is not satisfied with simple explanations here, 
but provides a complex and detailed analysis. The findings are depic-
ted in tables and figures, which help the reader to follow the argu-
ment. Chapter Two, which compares the Indian experience with the 
experiences in other countries, will certainly serve as a great resource 
for comparative legal scholars. 
While Chapters One and Two do offer many new insights to the 
topic, Chapters Three to Six deal with historical facts that will be 
known to scholars who have previously engaged with the Indian perso-
nal law system. Nevertheless, the author here skilfully draws analytical 
conclusions that might not have been formulated in this way before. 
For instance, he depicts the connection between civil society activism, 
judicial interpretation in case law and legislative changes very well. His 
work draws on a huge number of sources, ranging from parliamentary 
debates to case law and interviews. In some aspects, the author could 
have focused even more on the gender dimension and the different 
and often diverging opinions of feminist scholarship on the personal 
laws. For instance, the critique of feminist scholarship and women’s 
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groups of the specific aspects of the personal laws and possible 
solutions to the pitfalls, the different strategies of activism, and the 
differentiation between formal and substantial equality could have 
been depicted in more detail. Further, the engagement with the cases 
could have taken into account the feminist critique not only of the 
outcomes of the judgments themselves but also of the language that is 
being used by the judges. These shortcomings, however, do not 
detract from the overall value of the book as a great resource which 
provides an extensive and ambitious analysis of the discourse on the 
personal laws. The monograph will be of great use to law students and 
legal scholars as well as to historians and political scientists.  
Concluding Remarks and Future Research Agenda 
The book review shows that the personal laws continue to be a much-
discussed topic and that recently the gender dimension, especially, has 
played a role in the debate. While discrimination against women 
through religion-based personal laws was a matter that earlier fea-
tured only in feminist scholarship and in the publications of women’s 
rights groups, it now appears to have entered the mainstream aca-
demic discourse. Scholars of law, political and social science look at 
the gender dimension and work on an increasingly interdisciplinary 
basis to cover the many dimensions of the personal laws. 
Academics have pointed out that it is not only the Muslim personal 
law – as commonly perceived – that encompasses problematic provi-
sions. The Hindu law and the other personal law systems also contain 
provisions that discriminate against women. Chavan and Kidwai have 
shown that both Hindu and Muslim law are problematic when looked at 
through a gender lens and both systems need reform. Solanki has 
demonstrated that the conception of the family in Hindu and Muslim 
law and adjudication does not actually differ as much as generally 
believed. And Agnes has depicted in great detail where all the different 
personal laws contain aspects that discriminate against women. Here, 
further scholarship could take the smaller communities into account 
even more. Only Agnes’ volumes engage in detail with all the personal 
laws, including those of Parsis and Jews. Most books put their focus on 
Hindu and Muslim law, neglecting the smaller communities. Here, the 
discourse could be opened up. Even if in terms of numbers the 
Christian, Parsi or Jewish communities are small in India, an engage-
ment with their legal systems could be enriching when analysing how 
legal pluralism functions. Further, Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs are 
 REVIEW ESSAY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
395 
officially governed by the laws of the Hindu Code Bills and hence are 
generally not studied as independent groups. But it might be 
interesting to ask what it means for these communities to be governed 
by a law that often deviates from their own legal cultures and trade-
tions.  
While the authors agree that the personal laws are problematic from 
a women’s rights perspective, the conclusion that they draw from this 
is not to call for unification from above through the national legis-
lature. Instead, the analysis of the literature shows that scholars 
regard the introduction of a Uniform Civil Code in India as rather 
unlikely, even undesirable. They definitely no longer call for it as a 
means to provide for gender equality. Instead, they suggest other 
means to accommodate gender justice in the personal laws. The idea 
of intersectionality has become important. Gender justice and religious 
freedom are perceived as compatible (with the goodwill of the involved 
actors). Agnes pleads for reforms from within the religious communi-
ties, similarly to Chavan and Kidwai. Serajuddin and Subramanian 
regard the role of the judiciary as important. Judges may foster 
women’s rights by progressively re-interpreting the personal laws. 
Lastly, Solanki argues that women in the Indian system of shared 
adjudication have the agency to choose among the different forums in 
order to seek gender justice.  
Another commonality in the books is the understanding of law as 
politics. The authors have left behind the rigid distinction between the 
legislative, the executive and the judiciary and the idea of a strict 
separation of powers. Instead, they point to the interconnections 
between the three actors when it comes to social change. Courts are 
seen as important motors of change which sometimes function as 
quasi-lawmakers. This goes hand in hand with the discourse on a 
global judicialisation – a shift of power from parliaments to the courts 
and other non-elected institutions. If gender justice is not brought 
about by the legislature in one massive legislative reform, then it must 
be brought about by other means: through step-by-step reforms from 
within the society, though judicial activism, or through the vast array 
of societal legal sites such as caste and sect councils, religious insti-
tutions, “doorstep courts” and women’s organisations. The women’s 
movement plays a central role here, as Agnes, Solanki and Subrama-
nian demonstrate.  
Future research could go deeper into this field of judicial activism in 
the context of personal laws. While Serajuddin has pointed out where 
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and how courts have deviated from traditional interpretations of 
Muslim law, a similar study could be carried out for the other personal 
law systems. And other than just pointing out the trends in judicial 
interpretation, it would be interesting to analyse why and under which 
conditions the judges have deviated from older case law. Who has 
influenced them? Are courts actively used by civil society in order to 
promote social change? What constrains the judges if they do not go 
as far in their decisions as they theoretically could? And can social 
change actually be brought about as long as the institutions which 
interpret and execute the law are patriarchal and biased?  
All the books – on a larger or a smaller scale – have referred to legal 
situations in countries other than India. This comparison with other, 
equally diverse countries, with countries that maintain a system of 
legal pluralism, with other former colonies, or with countries that have 
successfully reformed religious personal laws seems promising and 
could certainly be taken a step further. Subramanian has provided a 
detailed outline on where and under what conditions states have 
reformed their religion-based family laws. It would be interesting to 
see whether gender equality has actually been improved on the ground 
in these countries and how far the findings are applicable to the Indian 
context. Lastly, a comparison the other way round might be interesting 
too. In a globalised world in which migration and diversification are 
important topics, can Western states learn from the Indian model of 
legal pluralism or shared adjudication in order to foster religious 
tolerance and a peaceful coexistence? 
                                                          
Endnotes 
1
 Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs are governed by the laws of the Hindus. See for instance Section 2 (a) 
of the Hindu Marriage Act. 
2 
The Warren Hastings Plan of 1772 provided that Hindus and Muslims were to be governed by 
their own laws in disputes relating to inheritance, marriage, caste and other religious usages and 
institutions. Later, in 1781, succession and inheritance were added to this list. 
3
 For a detailed description of the reforms see Agnes 2011: 19. 
4
 Nehru himself thought about the Hindu Code Bills as a “method of preparing the ground” for a 
Uniform Civil Code (Baird 1993/2005: 22). Scholars like Derrett have regarded the laws in a 
similar fashion. 
5 
The introduction of the Hindu Code Bills had faced resistance especially due to the regulations 
regarding women's rights. Many provisions of an earlier and much more progressive draft than 
the one later adopted had to be taken out or amended as they were regarded as ‘anti-Hindu’ and 
‘anti-Indian’. The outcome, which was in some ways a watered-down version, dissatisfied the 
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then law minister Ambedkar so much that it caused him to resign (see for instance Williams 
2006: 104). 
6
 Their critique concerns the terminology as well as the content of the laws. The decision to 
include Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs in the purview of the Hindu Code Bills has been criticised as 
part of a terminological ‘Hinduisation’ against the will of minorities (Menon 2012: 23). Further, 
feminists point out that several customary rights of women (especially lower caste practices and 
practices from the South of India, like customs of matrilineal inheritance) were sacrificed in the 
interest of uniformity and reflect patriarchal views (Agnes 2004: 79; Menon 2012: 26). 
7
 Now sometimes titled ECC as in Egalitarian Civil Code. See for instance the Newsletter by the 
Delhi based women's rights organisation SAHELI from March 1997, “An Egalitarian Civil Code: 
Every Woman's Basic Right.” Available at: 
 https://sites.google.com/site/saheliorgsite/communalism/personal-laws-debate/egalitarian-
civil-code-every-womans-basic-right [retrieved 10.07.2015]. 
8
 See for instance The Hindu, “Uniform Civil Code: Will it Work in India?”, 23 November 2014, 
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/open-page/uniform-civil-code-will-it-work-in-
india/article6625409.ece [retrieved 30.07.15]. Or Indian Express, “Govt start wider consultations 
on Uniform Civil Code”, 12 December 2015, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/politics/govt-
to-start-wider-consultations-on-uniform-civil-code/ [retrieved 10.07.2015]. 
9
 In the Shah Bano case, the Indian Supreme Court granted maintenance to a Muslim divorced 
wife under a secular law (Section 125 CrPC), despite the fact that traditional Muslim law does not 
recognise maintenance payments beyond a three months iddad period. The judgment provoked 
discontent and revolt among the Muslim community.  
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